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With the international economic crisis, the drought and food production 
crises in Africa, all of the economic indicators show a negative growth and 
a decrease in the qiality of life of most African peoples. After two and* one- 
half "development decades" of the United ''ations, the international community 
and the individual states have clearly failed in their goal.. Even'large 
and diversified economies like Brazil and Mexico, with definite indicators, ox 
economic growth, are the largest debtors, "National" development no longer 
seems possible. Further, individual states find the colonial legacy of 
underdevelopment too difficult to transfom in the period of economic crisis. 
Even countries like Angola and Mozambique, who won national revolutions 
and began social revolutions to transform production relations, have found 
the inherited economic linkages an inimical barrier to development.'
Born in the struggle for political independence of Zimbabwe, the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) brings together nine econo­
mies in the region (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) to address problems of their colonial legacy 
of underdevelopment, their vulnerability to present economic crises, and 
their dependence on the South African apartheid economy. This paper 
analyzes the ability of SADCC, as an innovative model for regional cooper­
ation, to coordinate their policies and set priorities for regional develop­
ment.
The first section briefly reviews the international economic crisis of 
capitalism and shows that the monetarist approach to a "solution" is, in fact, 
an explicit policy to increase exploitation of the producers in developing 
countries. The second section analyzes the economic contradictions of the 
SADCC nine, resulting from their positions in the international division of 
labour. These contradictions are important obstacles to regional coordination. 
Finally, the study investigates SADCC planning in agriculture, .coordinated 
by Zimbabwe. As a priority of SADCC, agriculture is the first productive 
sector that SADCC is trying to coordinate.
There are some real successes for SADCC, ones which point to the idea 
that regional coordination may alleviate somevhat the continued exploitation 
by the advanced capitalist states. On the other hand, real economic and 
military sabotage of SADCC could make it falter tomorrow. SADCC, however, 
already offers lessons for economic policies and planning under conditions 
of crisis.
f
N.B. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars.
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I. The International Economic Context for Planning
>
Crisis of International Capitalism
-The present crisis of international capitalism arises from the objective 
conditions of capital: at the end of the 1960’s the decline in Jhe rate of 
profit was precipitous and has not recovered to previous levels. Further­
more, the "solution" to this present decline is standard; the poor, by 
class and by country, are squeezed more in order to increase profitability 
for the capitalist class. What is new for the present crisis are the tactics 
employed to force greater surplus value out of the producers.
In the 1970's the strategy of the.advanced capitalist states was to in­
crease production of both armanents and food in older to offset the decline 
in profitability of capital and producer goods. The increase of exports in 
both from the United States, for example, alleviated the balance of payments 
deficit. However, production of both required heavy government subsidies which 
contributed to the well-discussed "fiscal crisis of the state."2 For example, 
in the EEC, two-thirds of the entire budget was used to subsidize export 
crops.3 Monetary policies were also tried, as the U.S. simply announced that 
the dollar would no longer be supported by gold, and two de facto devaluations 
of the dollar occurred (1971, 1973). The first -distinct "remedy" to the 
continuing crisis was initiated in 197^ with the oil price increase: it turned 
the terms of trade against primary commodity producers as the higher price 
of oil was fully incorporated into the price of manufactures, but not into 
the price of primary commodities. National currencies in developing countries 
became "overvalued;" in short, exchange rates were used to cheapen the cost 
of labour and therefore, goods, to obtain raw materials for less from the 
developing countries. The Bank of England reported in 1982 that the reduction 
of inflation undep the Thatcher government was mainly a consequence of the 
decline on the prices of primary commodities from the Third World.^ -
Hot able to pay for the importation of manufactures because the terms of 
trade had deteriorated to one-half or less in a few years, the developing 
countries increased their debt. For example, the purchasing power of one 
ton of copper, coffee, or cotton for barrels of oil fell to 50 percent from 
1975-1980; countries like Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique would have 
to double production of their commodity in order to buy the same number of 
barrels of oil.5 (Of course, other conditions like drought, poor management, 
inefficiency etq. were factors in the rising debt; this point simply em­
phasizes the international economic context of the other domestic problems.)
The commercial banks were ready to supply money to the deficit countries 
because the oil producers had deposited petrol dollars in Western banks; they 
had plenty o liquidity to loan out.
Stagflation became full scale recession in 1980. With monopoly control 
of production in many sectors, prices do not decline as demand decreases. 
Instead, production is cut, resulting in retrenchment of labour. With the 
recession, the developed countries purchas*** less fronthe developing. Trade 
declined drastically. With decreased trade and deterioration in the terms 
of trade, the debt of the developing countries multiplied.
The second distinct tactic to deal with the crisis was initiated by ^resi­
dent Harter in 1979, but fully implemented by Reagan; he rejected Keynesian 
fiscal policies to deal with the recession and turned to monetarist policy.
The floating interestrate climbed to unprecedented levels and by 1984, more 
capital flowed to the U.S. than to all the Thijd World combined.® “or each
\
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one percent increase in the int^r ct r..te, the debt service of the Third 
World increases 03.5 billion; the total debt service of the Third World in
1985 had reached 0 13 billion.' For most of the members of SADCC, the debt 
is 25 percent of export earnings and for Mozambique, it is over jO percent,8
. In the monetarist "solution" to the recession and to the fiscal crisis of 
the capitalist state, however, practice has not followed theory. In addition 
to floating interest rates, government expenditures axe to be cut. Yet the 
choice of cuts are clearly direct attacks on the poor as social welfare 
expenditures are decreased, but huge subsidies for corporations building 
weapons axe maintained. In the guise of reducing government expenditures-in 1985, 
Reagan vetoed a farm credit allocation by Congress of 0 3 billion which would 
have saved many farmers from losing their land to bankers and agribusiness 
(about 80,000 farms were bought out in 1964). At the same time, Reagan 
lobbied very hard for the next stage of the MX missile development at the 
cost of 01.5 billion while the total defense expenditures'for fiscal year
1986 axe 0 322 billion, a 6 percent increase above inflation over 1985*°
These allocations were at the time when Pentagon investigations were exposing 
million dollar surcharges by the weapons industries to the government.
Theory was also abrogated by the protectionist moves of the Reagan 
Administration. Monetarist theory advocates a "free market," but Reagan has 
set the highest tariff barriers since the 1920’s in the U.S. Under the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement, even the developing countries must "voluntarily" 
reduce textile exports to the U.S. The American delegations to Japan to 
bully the government into lowering their exports are well known.
The high interest rates and the huge U.S. deficit from weapons expenditure 
meant that the U.S. became a net borrower of capital. From 1917-1982, the U.S. 
was a net lender of capital. C. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute . 
for International Economics, stated that in two years (1980-1982), the U.S. 
"frittered away its creditor position of 65 years. " H  In the 19th century 
capital flowed to the U.S. to finance industrialization;’ the present surge 
seems to be financing re-industrialization, as the U.S. tries to regain 
its overall economic dominance by leading in certain sectors: armaments, 
nuclear technology, petxo-chemicals, electronics, etc.
The economic policies have established very difficult— if not impossible- 
economic conditions for developing countries to pursue growth. More signifi­
cant for the pursuit of any economic change are the political goals of the 
policies.
The monetarist policies of reduced government subsidies for social wel­
fare, high interest rates, tax incentives for investment— amd the unprecedented 
U.S. deficit spending— are resulting in a net flow of capital away from the 
developing countries and serve. important policital goals of the advanced 
capitalist states. First, the intematiohal lending organizations have 
regained their power. With the petro dollars, the commercial banks were 
loaning more to the developing countries than the IMF or the World Bank. The 
Third World debt crisis has increased the role of the IMF as international 
policeman to make sure that the poor countr c... ' xf ill economic conditions - 
which will guarantee their debt repayments. If the country does hot comply 
with IMF conditions, they receive no further IMF or World Bank loans, but - 
also no cbmmerical bank loans and even government aid programs can be stopped 
(e.g. Tanzania, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Grenada, etc.).
The IMF conditions axe well known: reduction of government subsidies and 
social services, even though in most debtor countries the public sector 
accounts for no higher percentage of GBP than in the advanced industrialized
countries. What has not been adequately discussed about these conditions 
is that they are a direct attack on the role of the state in Third World 
economies.
From the perspective of the IMF, the state, whether it is Supporting 
capitalist or socialist production, is not to intervene. The state role 
in production and, marketing is to be privatized; the market is to direct 
production and exchange. T^e fact that the "freemarket" has never existed in 
many Third World economies because of colonial control and that the state is 
needed to intervene to deal with historical distortions inherited from 
colonialism is not important to the monetarists. The market orientation allows 
the strongest (by class and by nationality) to grow and increase their 
holdings. This approach clearly gives an advantage t6 advanced capital in 
general and to U.S. capital in particular which is interested in new markets 
which have be<ftdominated by colonial powers on the African continent.
The state, therefore, must not interfere with these "market forces
The World Bank also expouses this appraoch and is lending less to the 
public sector and for oil purchases. Net investment by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank for private business ventures in 
developing countries reached an all-time high of $ 6l0 million in fiscal 
year 1985 (55 percent over what was loaned in 1984-), while total lending declined 
in 1985 by over 0 1 billion.*3 The World Bank policy for the 1980's is 
growth in the economy as a whole through "market mechanisms and fair pricing."
Governments in conservative states are also promoting private production 
and marketing. The U.S. government is the strongest advoeate of such terms 
and even offers special bonuses in aid if a government is promoting private 
business. U.S.A.I.D. will lend only to private farmers in the Third World, 
and openly asserts that aid is given to promote U.S. corporate interests. **
Teresa Hayter suggests that "aid" is such a misnomer that it must now be 
renamed "export subsidy" of "public subsidy for private profit" or even 
"funds for counter-insurgency. "1-5
The interest rate shock to developing countries already in debt and 
the demand for privatization of production and marketing to receive loans call 
to order any country which thought it might be free from dependence relations.
The governments find themselves with few policy alternatives, for even if growth 
does increase, it will be mainly to service the debt, not to increase the 
quality of life of their people. The burden is so.severe that critics are 
calling for political organizing and collective action to attack it. The 
President of Argentina, Raul Alfonsin, stated, "Latin America cannot pay its 
foreign debt through the hunger of its people for two reasons: first, 
because it is immoral and second, because it is impossible." The 
publisher of the Toronto Globe and Mail stated,. "The problems are such 
that a long-term solution cannot be developed and implemented unless and until 
the matter becomes politicized."^ Leaders as different as Fidel Castro and 
Julius Nyerere are calling for a debtors' cartel to refuse to honor the debts.
The policy of the lenders, however, is to render these states impotent. Call- 
irgfor the zation of production and for market solutions weakens *>'■’ _
ability of the state to intervene in the economy, to demand political resolutions 
to the problems.
This attack on the role of the state in the economy turns into overt 
military sabotage if a state is trying to transform to socialism. The events 
are well-known in Southern Africa (Angola, Mozambique) and in Central America
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(Nicaragua, Grenada). Support is increased to repressive governments if they 
can crush the/demands of the workers and peasants (Chile, Philippines,
South Korea, El Salvador). As Reginald Green points out, a good indicator 
of the failure of IMP conditionality is that democratic governments cannot 
fulfill the conditions ."This tactic is not new, but there is no attempt 
at economic cooptation of those looking for alternatives; it is gunboat 
diplomacy with a new vengeance.
Southern Africa and South African Destabilization , /
These international economic relations are clearly replicated in Southern 
Africa. Perennial conditions like the foreign exchange crisis of the region's 
economies benefit South Africa. It is strong enough to offer long-term 
credit to importers of its goods, while the neighbors need immediate payments 
for their exports. When Zambian producers finally get approval for a foreign 
exchange allocation, they sure in desperate need of parts or other goods to 
maintain production. They, therefore, go to the nearest market, which is 
o ten South African; the exporters increase the price because they know the 
Zambian producer is trapped and needs the goods immediately.
The battle in Southern Africa is for cheap labor and cheap mineral 
supplies; apartheid is profitable. Any country which offers an alternative 
to apartheid, which shows that black African nations can rule themselves or 
which assists South Africans in their struggle is a "legitimate" target.
SADCC, for all its weaknesses (to be discussed shortly), poses a threat 
to South Africa. South African trade with all African states was # 1.5 billion 
in 1981, but Zimbabwe is South Africa's most important trading partner. It 
is estimated that 2 million wage Jobs would be lost in South Africa if trade 
with the region were curtailed. -^9 SADCC is replacing historical infrastructures 
which linked all production and marketing activities in the region to the 
South. The alternative routes to the sea would clearly reduce South African 
revenue and its economic grip on regional trade. Other entities, like the 
Southern African Regional Commission for Conservation of the Soil (SARCUSS), 
which used to coordinate agricultural research in the region, are being 
replaced. Formed in 1950, the.Commission became quite limited as each successive 
Southern African state gained independence and removed itself from 
SARCUSS (starting with Zambia in 1964). Now the Southern African 
Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) is in position 
and is taking over completely the job of SARCUSS.
The relationship of SADCC to South Africa has gone through three periods. 
From 1979-1981, in the euphoria of Zimbabwe's independence, SADCC statements 
had a high political content. In 1981 at Blantyre, Malawi even joined its 
neighbors . in a strong condemnation of apartheid. From 1981-1984, South African 
destruction of SADCC projects, combined with the draught, modified SADCC 
rhetoric. By 1985, South African policy toward SADCC haw become clear. South 
Africa is trying to coopt economically only Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho (e.g. 
subsidizing transport, Richard's Bay railroad, Highland Water Scheme, etc.)
It will not offer economic carrots to any of the Frontline States within 
SADCC, not ever Mozambique after -!komati, not even Botswana. The Fr^ nii!.:.-* 
States will be destabilized; the other three will be lured away as much as 
possible from SADCC. It is significant that neither Malawi nor Swaziland 
sent heads of state to the SADCC Summit in Arusha in August 1985.
South African destabilization of SADCC members cost themj£l0.1 billion 
from 1980-1985, or one-third of their total export earnings. Yet that 
figure is an underestimate, for destabilization.did not begin in 1980. By 
1981, six years after independence, the Angolan government had already cal­
culated #10 billion worth of damage from South African aggression. The 
Rhodesian war, aided by South Africa, cost Mozambique # 556 million. Military 
aggression has greatly added to the debt burden of the SADCC members.
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International Planning Models
Planning models brought to the'regiop by the international community to 
solve the debt and foreign exchange crisis follow the pattern described above. 
In fact, Tanzania is the leader in rejecting IMF conditionality, refusing the 
terms for five years. Zimbabwe restricted overseas remittances in 1984 in 
defiance of the IMF, has reduced some food subsidies but refuses to keep 
wages as low as the IMF demands. IMF conditions, even'when followed, have 
no more solved the problems in Southern Africa than elsewhere, as the case 
of Zambia shows.
The international economic crisis was expressed .mainly as a food crisis, 
as a three-year drought hit the region shortly after the recession began.
SADCC estimates that three years and $1 billion assistance are necessary for 
agricultural production and herds to attain pre-drought levels. However, 
the international planning suggested for that problem is also not new. For 
example, the World Bank is still pushing production of cash crops and 
opposing changes~4n land tenure. U.S.A.I.D. is still promoting private, "small 
farmer” production and the commercialization of agricultural inputs. These 
agencies have complained about the national parastatals involved in marketing 
grain, calling instead for "free market" conditions. The response of SADCC 
is unequivocal!
SADCC believes that economic strategy and structures must be 
shaped primarily by public policy and not ’free market’ forces: 
hence its approach is an interventionist or planned one. The 
present historically and externally imposed structures were not 
the result of ’free markets’ or perfect competition, but rather 
o^“ the planned actions of extra-regional states and corporations.
Therefore, the Lusaka Declaration (I960) concludes that these 
structures and relationships must be reversed and restructured 
by planned action of the independent states nationally and act­
ing together....Unless coordinated action is . . .planned 
jointly, national interventionism and regional reliance on 
market forces will always clash, with the regional cooperation 
efforts the inevitable victims.23 (emphasis mine)
Given the international crisis of capitalism which increases exploita­
tion of the producers in the Third World,. what can countries in the region 
do? The international models— for stabilization of production and for 
increased agricultural production— are old, generally have not worked, 
and mainly serve the interests of the promoters. What, if anything, can 
SADCC do with the reality of the international economic crisis and destabili­
zation, by South Africa? Before that question can be answered, we need to 
look first at the diversity of SADCC, for the constraints of the inter­
national economy are not new. A major difficulty for SADCC in facing 
the present crisis is the contradictions among the members resulting from 
the colonial legacy of their different positions in the international division 
of labour.
II. General Conditions for Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa
Although the SADCC economies are all underdeveloped, their different 
positions in the international division of labour set up contradictions among 
them. Mozambique is a service economy, for its major foreign exchange earners 
are the port and rail fees. Lesotho’s major export is still its manpower to 
the South African mines. For three of the SADGC. economies, two-thirds of 
their exports are from one commodity. (Angola, Botswana, Zambia), and one 
commodity accounts for over one-third of total exports for three more
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(Malawi-tobacco, Swaziland-sugar, Tanzania-coffee). As the table below 
shows, Zimbabwe is by fax the most diversified economy, with manufacturing 
accounting for 26 percent of GDP in 1981: ^











In Zimbabwe, however, 70 percent of the population is still directly dependent 
on land. Further, Zimbabwe has the largest proportion of foreign capital 
in the productive sectors; Zimbabwe alone accounts for one-third of all 
foreign investment in the SADCC countries.
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This diversity accounts for different priorities of economic planning 
in the countries. Most of the states follow a policy of import substitution 
as the basis for economic growth; they want to reduce imports as the economies 
develop to meet local consumption. Yet Botswana-Lesotho-Swaziland (BLS), with 
their membership in the South African Customs Union, cannot really protect 
their infant industries, so remain dependent on South African imports, with 
their "industry" relegated to parts assembly. Zimbabwe is pursuing growth 
based on exports and is, therefore, looking to the region for a market, 
because many Zimbabwean goods are not.competitive on the international market 
(cost of transport, relatively high cost of production). SADCC, therefore, 
does not try to coordinate these economic policies, but instead, focuses on 
axeas where agreement's possible in spite of these real contradictions.
Agriculture is a sector where progress has been made (to be discussed 
in the next section), but again, the different structures of production impinge 
upon efforts for coordination. For example, land is a key resource in 
Southern Africa and access to land determines the pattern of distribution—  
of employment, income and food. As the FAO bluntly stated, "Land is the 
major-input of production; when it is inadequate, or its tenure uncertain, 
the outcome is usually poverty levels of income."27 Although the general 
pattern in SADCC is the small peasant producer on communally owned land, 
the actual distribution of land varies greatly.
Botswana has both a reservation system for specific ethnic groups 
and a freehold system largely dominated by large cattle ranchers. Because 
the small scale farmer cannot grow enough grain to meet national consumption, 
the government now plans to open large tracts of land to "Whoever will 
develop it," whether it be agribusiness or individual Batswana (in areas 
such as Chobe, Tuli, Ngamiland, Okavango).
Most of those in Lesotho with land have only 1-6 hectares per family, 
combining individual and communal tenure. However, landlessness is the highest 
in tropical Africa— about 20 percent~and the leasehold system of the 1979 
Land Act could lead to greater numbers of landless people.^9
Although Swaziland has been independent more than fifteen years, there 
has been no programme of land redistribution: "the continued preemption of 
the best agricultural land by a few large estates relegates most farmers 
"to smallholding on poor land, with little hope of adequate returns for 
their labour."30 Zimbabwe faces similar distribution problems, which axe
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riot easily resolved, and the government has proceeded slowly, preferring 
to provide increased agricultural Inputs to the communal lands, than to pursue 
massive redistribution or commercial farm land.
If present trends in Zambia continue, the exploitation of individual 
commercial farms will take place at the expense of the best communal lands. 
Agricultural production will increase, but small farmers will be further 
marginalized. In Malawi, much communal land has already been allocated 
to private property. The World Bank claimed success of a "land reform" 
project in Lilongwe, saying that the privatization would give farmers greater 
security, but then contradicted itself by saying that a market in land would 
ensure that land reached its commercial potential and could then be sold. 3-*-
Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique have nationalized all land, but the 
experiments in cooperatives and state farms have not been very successful.
Problems of management, incentives, and organization— inevitable in the early 
stages— have not been resolved. The majority of production is still by small 
peasants. Tanzania (sisal) and Mozambique (sugar) have turned some of their 
state farms back, to private enterprise.
All of the SADCC members had a declining per .capita growth rate in food 
production from 1966-1981 (before the drought). <  Therefore, food is the first 
production priority. The PAO study concludes, however, that "in all the 
SADCC countries except Lesotho, the choice is clear: the governments will 
not be able to achieve objectives of greater self-sufficiency and equity unless 
the traditional sector gains more access to land."33
Yet land reform is not sufficient either. Agricultural policies about 
prices, marketing, agricultural inputs all affect production'— and the 
individual agricultural policies differ as much as the land tenure. The 
price for maize, for example, in the BLS are based on the South African 
Maize Board prices, plus retail and transport costs; they cannot independently 
set maize producer prices. In Malawi prices are mainly determined in a 
"free market," but in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the 
states all set producer prices for their major grains. Subsidies for basic 
foods^are provided in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, with Malawi .
and Zambia only subsidizing maize. The BLS do not provide consumer subsidies 3** 
(although Botswana is providing school lunches and other drought relief 
since 1982).
The governments intervene in marketing in all of the states, but to 
different degrees; the government only has a monopoly on tobacco marketing 
in Malawi and is involved in marketing only of milk, meat and maize in 
Swaziland. In all of the states, private traders axe permitted, but in 
some they are restricted from certain commodities (e.g. maize) and in others 
the state corporations generally must compete with the private traders.
These agricultural policy differences, of course, reflect the various 
ideologies of the SADCC members about the role of the state in the economy.
lawi advocates a free market economy, with little interference from the 
state, while Angola and Mozambique axe trying to use tne sU-te for transition 
to socialism. (Communal farming has a new life in the secure areas or Mozambique; 
communal fields are easier to protect than individual ones.) Zimbabwe and 
Zambia are state capitalist in that the state tries to ameliorate the worse 
abuses of the profit motive (establish priorities through price and wage 
control, etc.).
To coordinate this diversity is very difficult, but SADCC is a unique
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model on the African continent for economic cooperation. The aeahers are not 
pursuing economic integration} from the above few examples in agriculture, 
it is easy to see that goal is remote, and there is no congruence of 
ideology to promote it. SADCC has chosen, therefore, a decentralised structure 
and the goal of coordinating national action. The projects must follow mji£ygl 
interests and are accepted only if there is consensus. This decentralised, 
model encourages each member to take responsibility for a sector, to execute 
the policies which all nine have discussed and agreed upon.
mrn %
The economic context for SADCC is harsh: international crisis of • 
capitalism, destabilisation by South Africa, contradictions among SADCC 
members resulting from the international division of labour. To analyse 
SADCC planning in the face of these problems, the next section will focus 
on agriculture. By looking at agriculture, we can begin to understand in 
concrete terms how SADCC does or does not address the problems discussed 
above.
III. SADCC Agricultural Policy— Steps Toward Economic Planning
It must first be clarified that SADCC wplanningM is not planning in 
the strict sense of the term. SADCC policy is based 6n a general consensus 
but not to the degree that is usually assumed in economic planning. In 
addition, there is not the accountability in SADCC that one finds within a 
government. Specific governments are given specific tasks, but there is 
no real mechanism to guarantee that a job is done} if Swasiland chooses hot 
to pay attention to its role as coordinator of manpower, there is little 
SADCC can do but cajole. In short, the high degree of decentralisation in 
SADCC is a major characteristic which influences planning. The extent 
and effectiveness of planning will vary according to the country coordinator.
SADCC, however, has realized that the ad hoc, individual project approach 
to coordination has severe limitations for development. Therefore, planning 
by the. sectors will be'increased, . The annual report to the SADCC summit in 
Arusha, August 1985, gave not only a review of all sectors, but also called 
for five-year strategies for each sector: "Each sector will thus establish 
for Itself carefully defined and measurable targets of achievement... .The 
sector strategies...will ensure that, during the next phase of growth,
SADCC maintains a coherent overall approach to cooperation."35
For overall coordination of the sector plans, a macro-economic survey of 
the region is in process "against which it will be possible to assess the 
validity and relevance of SADCC’s sectoral programmes and also to measure 
progress in their implementation."^ This survey will offer background 
information necessary to assess the sector plans and is a beginning of 
coordination of data collection for the whole region. The planning, however, 
will remain decentralised in each sector.
It.is important, therefore, to analyze in some detail how one sector 
(food security) formulates policy. First, there will be an analysis of the 
deciuioff*«uking structure of the food security unit} then the policy priori­
ties will be analyzed to understand how they address the problems disdussed 
above.
Infrastructure —  Administration
Zimbabwe coordinates the food security sector of SADCC but also has 
responsibility for the overall coordination of agricultural research and 
animal disease control (Botswana), soil-water conservation and land utili­
zation (Lesotho), fisheries and wildlife (Kalawi) shd forestry (Malawi).
The importance of agriculture to SADCC is underlined by this fact that 
four of the nine members have responsibility for. agricultural concerns}
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fur ther, as will be discussed, priorities in industry (ihnzania) include 
production of agricultural implements, fertilizer etc.
The SADCC food security unit is based in the Ministry of Agriculture in 
Zimbabwe and it acts as the executive for food security projects. Decisions 
about food security, however, involve the full SADCC apparatus. The annual 
meeting of the Ministers or Agriculture set general policy for agriculture, 
discussing their various approaches. to production problems. In addition, they 
can initiate specific projects or modify proposals coming to them from the 
food security staff or the Consultative Technical Committees (CTC's). The 
CTC’s sure the working units of the food security sector; they thoroughly 
debate each aspect of each project, especially its technical feasibility and 
impact. They can also initiate projects or reject ones proposed from the food 
security staff. There are three CTC'ss extension, research, economics and 
marketing. Since 1982, agricultural Officials from the nine governments have 
mgt in each CTC annually and then have one joint annual meeting. After the 
Agricultural Ministesiand CTC’s discuss the projects, they are passed to the 
Standing Committee of Officials and then to the Council of Ministers who meet 
twice a year. Disputes about projects have been resolved at this level, but 
generally, they are concerned with overall policy.
This structure clearly shows that policy-making ("planning") occurs at 
several levels: l) Zimbabwe does not make decisions but is responsible for 
execution of the projects. For example, it has been criticized for being 
slow in implementation and for not seeking SADCC nationals as consultants.
2) The member states have a chance to debate overall policy issues about 
agriculture at three levels: Ministers of Agriculture, Standing Committee of 
Officials and the Council of Ministers. 3) Technical issues (which also 
reflect policy) axe discussed by each member in the CTC's.
Research and Development
Research is both centralized and decentralized within SADCC; individual 
members are in charge of research, but the information will be available in 
central locations. For example, project no. 3 ih food security is to establish 
a regional data bank on agriculture. The research CTC helped to establish 
a new Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) 
in Sibele, Botswana, under a Tanzanian director. SACCAR will not engage in 
direct research itself but will stimulate research through grants and by 
providing coordination of national research and of^training. It will 
encourage long-term planning of national research.
#
Actual research activities are decentralized. Zimbabwe has the sorghum- 
millet head office; Malawi is in charge of ground-nut research and Tanzania 
is to direct cowpea research. These research stations will conduct long-term 
(20-25 years) research to improve seed for the various ecological zones in 
SADCC. They will share their information with SACCAR.
The sorghum-millet project is now testing 6,750 varieties at three 
locationsi in Zimbabwe (Matopos, Aisleby Farm, Mzarabani) and in different 
ecological zones : n »•“ nine countries. Sorghum represents 52 percent of 
Botswana's cereal crop production and a Botswanan plant breeder relates 
how SADCC assists his work.-** First, he designates 100 varieties of seeds 
to be grown in Matopos, Zimbabwe; after visiting the fields, he chooses 20 
and then grows them in various areas of Botswana; he later can choose one 
or two to be marketed as improved seeds in Botswana. Second, he can send his 
young technicians to Matopos to be trained in the field. Third, he sends 
seedlings to Zimbabwe to be grown during the winter which is too cold in Botswana 
for a winter crop. They are returned to him, ready to propagate a. third-genera­
tion of seeds; research time is cut in half. Any of the SADCC countries can
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take advantage of these services of the sorghum-millet research, or choose to 
ignore them.
Other areas where simply sharing information may increase agricultural 
production is the early warning system, to be fully set up in each member 
' country by 1966. The system will record patterns of weather changes from 
season to season across the region. Animal and plant disease control . 
is also easier on a regional basis.
Manpower Training
A major constraint for increased production in Southern Africa is 
shortage of Skilled personnel, from the technician in the field to the agri­
cultural engineer. The CTC's offer workshops at the high governmental level 
for agricultural officials. They have covered a wide variety of topics in 
three years: land use planning, irrigation, extension, pricing, weed 
control, water conservation, range management, etc. As a Mozambican delegate 
said, they found the workshops very useful because they could improve in 
almost every area. To underline further problems of destabilization in the re­
gion, Angola has attended only one of eight workshops, not being able to re­
lease hard-pressed personnel for training. At the workshops they learn general 
skills but aleo about each others' methods} Zimbabwe, for example, is consider­
ed the model for agricultural extension, but not without criticism, such as 
Mozambique raising the question why producer cooperatives were not given 
first priority by extension workers. Swaziland is coordinator of manpower 
training in general in SADOC, but has not focused much on agriculture, except 
for a management development programme for senior agricultural managers.
In the first five years (really three for the food security unit), SADCC 
is well on its way to this functional coordination of agriculture. In fact, 
if SADCC were to falter tomorrow such entities aa SACCAR would probably 
continue to exist. What is amazing is that this obvious level of cooperation 
was only begun in I960} the colonial past (Portuguese vs. British, orientation 
to South Africa, etc.) weighs heavily in the region. This level of coordin­
ation is importanti however, it is not fundamental.
Food Production Policy
With the declining per capita food production and the debt burdens dis­
cussed above, SADCC had oonsensus on the priority.of food crop over cash 
crop production. (Even Zambia has moved from its long-term policy of financing 
food imports with copper.) The World Bank agenda of the 1970's, to increase 
foreign exchange earnings by cash crop exports, was rejected by SADOC in 
^ I960, even before three years of disastrous drought in the region. Instead,
the policy is to reduce imports by becoming self-sufficient in food production. 
At this point, only Malawi and Zimbabwe are food sufficient, in years of 
good rain.
The immediate priority is to reduce the vulnerability of the members to 
natural disasters. SADCC projects (early warning system, storage, seed 
stock) are to prepare better Z:,v the vagaries of weather in the region. Even 
Zimbabwe, with its highly developed hybrid Baize, had not paid attention to 
seeds which could withstand drought conditions. SADCC has completed feasibi­
lity studies about the size of grain storage capacity needs for the region, 
but the project will simply promote national grain storage facilities} there 
axe no immediate plans for regions! authority over storage. When natural 
disasters do occur, SADCC goes to the international community as a unit, as 
they did in 1 9 8 No attempt was made to prioritize the list of requests,
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but the joint action increased international awareness of the severity of 
the situation and facilitated a coordinated international response. The 
data presented highlighted the more dire needs and helped the less severely 
hit governments realise the relative needs among the economies.
Planning has included selection of grains for increased production: 
sorghum, millet, groundnuts, cowpeas, beans— crops traditionally grown by 
peasants in the region. Significantly, wheat and rice- are not on the list.
Planning in agriculture, how ever,must be multi-faceted. This lesson was 
bitterly learned by many African governments which transformed one sector 
(e.g. extension) only to find reduced production because of another growth 
factor (e.g. insufficient credit). In agricultural planning, there is no 
luxury of selectivity; many factors must be addressed at once. SADCC policy 
reflects this reality, but at the same time, reveals the limitations of region* 
al cooperation. First, the discussion will focus on the production areas 
SADCC has coordinated and second, analysis will be made of areas that SADCC 
is unable to address.
Improved seed is one long-term answer; medium-term inputs are also 
important. SADCC projects emphasize improving extension work, both in 
quantity of technicians and extent of their knowledge. The CTC's have held 
several workshops on extension to encourage each member to improve extension 
training.
The SADCC industrial sector, coordinated by Tanzania, has targeted farm 
implements and fertilizers as two priority areas. They have found that 
importing small tools costs 10 times more than if artisans made them, so 
artisan units have started production in Botswana, Lesotho, and Tanzania.
To increase fertilizer production from 255*000 tonnes per year in 1980 to 
the necessary **00,000 tonnes in 1990, SADCC is choosing the countries in 
which to rehabilitate or create new fertilizer plants.39 Coordination of 
tractor production, however, ham not been successful; Tanzania, Zambia and 
Swaziland have SADCC-sponsored tractor projects, but others, like Zimbabwe, 
proceed with their own testing and importing. Finally, demand for pesticides 
and insecticides will be met mainly by upgrading existing formulation plants 
in five of the members. In short, SADCC food security priorities have indi­
cated to the SADCC industrial sector what projectsshould be emphasized. As 
of July 1985, 20 of 51 industrial implementation projects were for agricul- ^  
ture, accounting for 35 percent of the total cost of SADCC industrial projects.
If production increases, then reduction of post harvest losses is necessary.
(FAO estimates that as much as 35%> of the grains are lost in Africa, Zimbabwe 
being a notable exception.) Storage, marketing and processing,of food 
are on the agenda. As stated above, storage will be under national control; 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have already considerably increased their capacities.
. The marketing project is the failure of the food security projects.
The feasibility study was given to a private Canadian firm, which recommended 
actions for agribusiness, ignored the SATCC transport proj:. its, and generally, 
did not follow the terms of reference. SADCC officials, especially from , 
Mozambique, protested and two years after that first study was completed, the 
CTC's and agricultural ministers have requested a new study. What the protest 
indicates is that SADCC countries will not simply accept, free market assumptions.
/ Aft discussed above, marketing is mainly controlled by the states, and SADCC 
accepts government intervention in the market.
Food processing will also be difficult to coordinate; right now basic 
questions like the milling of grain are being investigated. When the agenda 
f^i|||Ghss the questions of canned fruits and vegetables, then SADCC confronts the 
?eign-ownedvagribusiness firms in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has the most developed
AflJ, . . If. . 
*  %
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i'ood processing industry by far and much of it is foreign-owned (Unilever,
Brooke Bond, Delco). Che report states that Africans only consume 10-20 percent 
of their ood in processed form, while in industrialized countries, 85 percent 
of the food consumed is processed.Agribusinesses around the world are 
aware of this potential growth market. In theory, SADCC projects on food 
processing could regulate the entry ox agribusiness into the food processing 
industry, by setting priorities and conditions; on the other hand, its 
studies may simply provide the information that agribusiness needs to enter 
the market more easily.
SADCC food security has not yet even addressed other areas which experts 
say are crucial,to increased production. SADCC has stated that agricultural 
pricing policies must remain national policies, given the differences in the 
political economies and the farming systems. Yet research for improved seeds 
of sorghum and millet will not be used by farmers if producer prices are 
not high enough; most governments do not include sorghum and millet in 
their official prices. Land tenure is ignored by SADCC, claiming it is pro­
moting projects for both large and small-scale farmers. Whether cooperatives 
are encouraged, consumer incentives given to farmers, or easy credit offered 
is also left to national policy. But each of these items— pricing, 
credit, land tenure, nature of ownership and incentives— are as crucial'to 
increased production as the items SADCC is discussing.
One specific concern reflects at once the potentiality of SADCC and its 
severe limitations. In all the documents and accounts of meetings, there- is 
talk of helping the "small producer.” Sorghum-millet is for the "small pro- , 
ducer;" appropriate technology, small-scale irrigation, etc. are all for 
the small producer. Quickly, however, one realizes that the concept has 
many definitions. U.S.A.I.D.— which is the major donor for the food security 
unit, the sorghum-millet project, a major food security study at the Univer­
sity of Zimbabwe, and a partial funder of the grain-legume research and of 
SACCAR— is clear that their goal is a green revolution in seeds for Southern 
Africa. They want hybrids which will multiply production per hectare. ^  
However, the hybrids will only grow with fairly exact quantities of water, 
fertilizer, and pesticides; marginal farmers cannot always get those inputs 
in the quantities or with the timing needed. If not applied, the hybrids 
yield less than traditional seeds. This fact has increased the wealth of 
emergent farmers in India using hybrid rice, while impoverishing thousands 
more. Production increases, but at the expense of those who are written 
off as "less efficient." They become farm labourers, often losing their land 
to debt repayment.
In interviews with SADCC officials, many are concerned about the problem.
A Botswanan agriculturalist said that many Botswanan peasants simply will not 
have inputs necessary for the hybrids. He says that the SADCC Matopos project 
is fine because it releases time a d money for him to concentrate Botswa an - 
research on "stable producers." They do not yield as mu -h as hybrids 
but also are not as vulnerable to variable inputs; the marginal Botswanan 
farmer can therefore use +h.e n+able producers and still sell to the market 
in good years. In-a bad year, ne will avoid a total crop failure of the 
hybrids. At the same time, the hybrids from the Matopos can be used by 
the emergent master farmers who can purchase all the inputs and make sure 
they arrive on time.
Mozambique agricultural experts think that models of farming are i ac­
curate. They contend that the small farmer is relative; he or she may 
have two hectares and grow a surplus or 10 hectares and be subsistent only. , 
Mozambique criticizes the emphasis on emergent farmers, for they say that 
farmers are emergent because they have already received some subsidies.
Mozambique's priority, and they think it should be the priority of SADCC, 
is to bring subsistent farmers up to the level of marketing surplus.
Zimbabwe has done just that. Farmers4 in the communal lands sure msurketing 
more than before, because of the increased inputs such as the ones discussed 
above; it is a success story of which Zimbabwe can be proud. However, trends 
are being established which could create difficult social conditions. Unless 
concentrated effort is made to help the poorest of the poor, the agricultural 
inputs will be used most by the more efficient farmers, with marginal ones be­
coming insolvent. * Debt or inability to purchase seed or fertilizer will 
send the family to the city to look for jobs, releasing their land for re­
allocation to "more efficient" farmers. The increasing number of unemployed 
is blamed on their own farming inefficiency. Agricultural production increases 
because of the master farmers; the gross statistics look fantastic, especially 
to the planners. Food becomes abundant...for those who can afford it.
SADCC is assisting the establishment of infrastructure— administration, 
research and manpower training— basic to any coordination of production. In 
agriculture, there is consensus that each member should be self-sufficient 
in food, but in the interim, Zimbabwe will export to the region; this season 
purchases have already been made by Zambia and Mozambique.*" It is a conven­
ient coincidence of interests, for Zimbabwe does have grain to export, but 
with transport costs, its grain would not be price competititve outside the 
region. Regional cooperation is planned to remove obstacles to food pro­
duction, but there is no attempt to coordinate production itself.
Similarities of Food Policy to Other SADCC Sectors
SADCC agricultural policy does reflect similar constraints in the other 
SADCC sectors. Priority has been given overall to infrastructure— such as 
the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC). Coordina­
tion of industrial production is left for the future. Right now the projects 
only slightly coordinate small producer items, like the tools and fertilizer 
mentioned (also textile chemicals, cement, etc.). Capital goods coordination 
is not on the agenda, nor is there discussion of how to deal with the trans­
national corporations in' any unified way. With nine separate investment codes, 
there is no consensus about the role of foreign investment. However, in 1986 
two investment promotion conferences axe scheduled for investment financiers 
and corporations. Commercial enterprises are also invited to the Industrial 
Rehabilitation Workshop jn Arusha in September 1985.-5 In the absence of any 
coordination about foreign investment, these conferences could open the door 
to foreign corporations "helping" SADCC "plan" industry.
The international terms of trade for export crops and other primary 
commodities will not improve for the long term for the reasons discussed 
in Section I. Another SADCC goal is, therefore, to increase trade among 
themselves, but as yet there is no trade policy. SADCC, in contrast to the 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA), states that trade follows production. Their 
analysis is that production constraints (transport, spare part? skilled 
manpower) are much greater trade barriers than tariffs. The trade . rrangenent 
is mainly bilateral, with only Botswana and Mozambique multilaterally balancing 
^their trade in the region. To try to alleviate the foreign exchange shortage, 
which reduced production and trade, several are entering bilateral counter­
trade. Mozambique and Tanzania have the most developed arrangement. They
* This small producer debate in SADCC does not address further problems that 
female food producers have in the rural areas. In all ,of SADCC (really in 
all of the world, it is the female single heads of households who are the 
poorest of the poor.
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pay each ether in local currency, until one reaches the surplus limit. That 
partner is then asked to settle the account by purchasing more. Tanzania 
also has countertrade arrangements with Zambia and Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe has 
further countertrade with Zambia and Mozambique.**® Discussions are 
proceeding between PTA and SADCC about trade agreements, but Botswana,
Mozambique and Angola are not members of PTA.
In summary, SADCC is concerned with changing the forces of production 
to reduce costs. It does not even raise questions about relations of production, 
because-of the contradictions discussed in Section II. At the same time, 
however, SADCC is very useful in rationalizing infrastructure and expanding 
services which support production. In agriculture, each needs to increase 
food production so there is no conflict of interest or competition for 
markets. In the areas where there might be conflict-such as fertilizers 
and tractors— the record is mixed; some rationalization of fertilizer 
production is occurring, but tractor production continues, unabated by SADCC 
plans. The goal of complementarity of production(remains on paper.
SADCC as a Negotiating Unit
A newly emergent characteristic of SADCC, one which shows its relative 
success, is that it is beginning to relate to outside organizations as a re­
gional. entity. The Nordic countries are enthusiastic about region-to-region - 
relations; they see a Nordic-SADCC relation as a mini-NIEO. They have 
proposed region-to-region cooperation in four areas: development assistance, 
trade, raw materials, cultural cooperation, and the emphasis is on transfer of 
technology, not just exchange.**? This proposal is facilitated by the fact that 
the Nordics have been the most out-spoken against apartheid and have actually 
reduced their own economic ties with the racist regime. Further, their contri­
bution to SADCC is a full one-third of all the OECD countries' contributions; 
they have committed 0 200 million to JO SADCC projects (in addition to kQ
assistance to individual members which amounted to 0 ^ 75 million in 1983 alone).
As the Swedish delegate to the Mbabane conference stated, "...your association 
, within SADCC has influenced us in getting together to exchange, information 
and experience from development assistance and to pool resources in order to 
render support from our region to your region more effective. "**9
With Angola joining at the end of April 1985, all the SADCC countries 
are now part of the Lome Convention. Already, the Frontline States within 
SADCC have requested negotiations with the EEC about its relation to South 
Africa- They feel that EEC contributions to SADCC are often used as an 
excuse to continue their.close.relations with South Africa. One concrete 
example of the region-to-region cooperation is the recent negotiations for 
selling beef to the EEC. Botswana and Zimbabwe will jointly market meat in 
the EEC, and management of sales will be provided by the Botswana Meat 
Commission for both countries. They will not compete with each other,for quotas.
Other donors have begun to group themselves together also. The Cooperation 
for Development in .Africa (CDA) is an informal sssociation of donor countries 
(Eelg-iwn, Canada, FGR, France, Italy, UK, USA). It was formes ir. be 1980 
with the understanding that "certain economic problems cannot Be solved by 
one country" and with the goal of relating to "African international organiza­
tions."^ They have designated five zones of interest: Sahel, Sudan,
Coastal-Central West Africa, Zaire Basin, East Africa, Southern Africa. The 
U.S. is the overall coordinator for Southern African relations, with the 
U.K. as the alternate. Their priorities are for training, crop research net­
working, and international agricultureal research centers. Such groupings
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could be potentially helpful, with coordination from the donor side, avoiding 
such catastrophes as JO different water pumps in one district, all needing 
different spare parts. There is also the. inherent danger that such coordination 
is for the donors to gain strength vis-a-vis SADCC. Certainly, such region-to- 
rcgion cooperation as CDA-SADCC is not among "equal" partners. SADCC response 
will determine whether donor coordination is for greater efficiency in 
responding to SADCC needs or for greater control of SADCC from the outside.
Admitting that the Lagos Plan of Action has not proceeded much, the 
July 1985 OAU summit discussed further economic plans. SADCC spoke there as 
a unit and shared its lessons. For example, the decentralized model for 
coordination— each country assigned a sector— was considered as a model for 
the larger OAU coordination. In addition, the PTA is now looking for funds 
to build transport infrastructure, to overcome this trade barrier in Eastern 
and Southern Africa.
It is too early to say that SADCC is increasing the international bar­
gaining power of its members. Clearly, some crucial areas, like international 
commodity prices, will not be influenced by SADCC at all. However, SADCC 
acting as a unit in international fora will gradually change the perception of 
outside countries about the region; this change may someday be reflected 
in their foreign policies.
Conclusion
SADCC is not pursuing economic integration; in that respect, the modesty ' 
of its goals contrasts sharply with the Lagos Plan ox Action, or even the PTA.
It does not intend to set up autonomous "international organizations" which 
begin to tale on a life of their own. The decentralized, coordinated national 
action, therefore, concentrates on areas of mutual interest. It is not 
"planning" in that one authority will guarantee that concrete steps will be 
taken toward an agreed objective. However, SADCC is not ad hoc either.
In agriculture, no "shopping list" of projects is presented to donors; each 
aspect of the projects has been debated at several levels of SADCC. Only 
when a project has attained consensus will it appear on a feasibility study 
list. At many stages, it can be dropped or totally modified. Finally, the 
five year strategies for each sector, available in 1986, will greatly in­
crease SADCC planning, as each sector designates its goals within the 
realities of the regional economy.
Initial SADCC coordination has focused on areas where cooperation is 
easy, where national interests coincide. This emphasis has resulted it a' 
successful record of functional coordination for the first five years: admini­
stration, infrastructure, research, some training. With only small producer 
goods on the list, coordination of industrial production, in contrast, has been ele­
mental. The contradictions among SADCC members will circumscribe the ambitious 
goal of production complementarity. *.
SADCC— in all its modesty— does, however, confront the dominant interests 
in the international economy. It rejects the ’Iffifie^maBket" solution advocated 
by the IMF, World Bank, and other add agencies. Resisting the demand to 
privatize their marketing of agricultural products, they are also increasing 
production first in food crops, not cash crops. They insist that the state 
must intervene in the economies for better planning to overcome colonial 
distortions. "Cost-benefit" analysis alone cannot work, for it is to the 
advantage of the strongest, most often foreign capital. Economic decisions 
must include political considerations to promote growth with equity. These 
differences with the dominant interests are not negligible.
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Can SADCC begin to alleviate the problems of the international economic 
system? Many of its projects address the problem of chronic foreign exchange 
shortages and of debt due to reduced production. The first priority of 
agriculture is import-substitution of food imports, of agricultural 
inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, seed), of machine imports(hand tools, tractors). 
Export growth is more difficult, but SADCC does have the goal of reducing 
competition and increasing exports in the region by production coordination 
(e.g. fertilizer). Trade is proceeding with counter-trade arrangements 
to purchase each others' goods in local currencies.
These strategies, however, are dependent on foreign aid— on economies 
whose policies have exacerbated SADCC conditions in the first place. Eighty- 
seven percent of the food security unit projects and 100 percent of the 
agricultural research require foreign aid SADCC states that their rationali­
zation of the infrastructure, coordination of some import substitution and 
collective scrutiny of projects reduce the influence of donors. Further, 
their cooperation attracts more donor capital which should be flowing to the 
region anyway. Clearly, SADCC has attracted more capital collectively them 
they wpuld have done individually (especially for Angola auid Mozambique). Yet 
the capital does enter the region in the interest of those who have aggravated 
the problems of developing countries.
SADCC has survived its infancy during the height of an international 
recession, a three-year drought, military sabotage against its projects, 
and a full-scale war in two the nine members. It is moving from the feasibility 
study stage to planning five year strategies for each sector. The members 
remain enthusiastic about pursuing their various interests within SADCC. The 
road, however, from its present, functional coordination to complementarity of 
production in order to transform production forces* is a long one.
- 18-
NOTES
1. Gerard Dum&nil, Mark Glick, and Jose Rangel. "The Trend of the Rate of 
Profit to Fall in the U.S., Part I," Contemporary Marxism, no. 9,(fell 198*0, 
pp. 148-164.
They discuss the decline in the rate of profit for the developed capitalist 
world, see. pp. 160-1. '
2. James O'Connor. The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1973)• This work was one of the initial ones which started the debate.'
3. FAO. World Food Report (Rome: FAO; 1984), p. 13.
4. Bank of England. Quarterly Bulletin (30 September 1982), as reported in 
the Financial Times-(l October 1982).
5. Carol B. Thompson. Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States in
the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985). PP. 95-6.
6. Bernard Chidzero, Minister of Finance, Zimbabwe, speech at the British- 
Zimbabwe Society, Harare, 6 June 1985.
7. Commonwealth Institute. "SADCC— Development in the Region: Progress and 
Problems," Conference Report (London: Commonwealth Institute, 18-20 July 1984),
P. 7.
8. Guardian (Botswana), 1 February 1985.
9. Debt Crisis Network. Draft of a Working Paper, Chapter 1 (Washington, D.C.:
April 1985), PP- 5-6. .
The Pentagon wants 48 MX missiles in 1985, at a cost of 04 billion.
10. South (April 1985), p. 67.
11. New Tfork Times (18 November 1984).
For discussions of the monetarist approach to the crisis, see 
Trevor Evans. "Money Makes the World go Round," Capital and Class, no. 24 
(Winter 1985), pp. 100-123.
James Tobin. "Monetarism: An Ebbing Tide?" The Economist (27 April- 
3 May 1985).
Martin Feldstein. "Monetarism: Open-eyed Pragmatism," The Economist 
(18-24 May 1985).
Vladimire Andreff, "The International Centralization of Capital and the 
Reordering of World Capitalism," Capital-and Class, no. 22 (Spring 1984), pp.
59-80.
124 David F. Gordon and Joan C. Parker. "The World Bank and Its Critics: The 
Case of Sub-Saharan Africa," Rural Africana. nos. 19-20 (Spring-Fall 1984), p. 14.
13. Financial Gazette (Harare), 9 August 1985. The same article reports a 
record World Bank profit of 01.14 billion in fiscal 1985.
14. Promotion of private production in agriculture is in mosVU.S.A.I.D. documents. 
For one example, see U.S.A.I.D., Countary Development Strategy Statement - Zimbabwe 
FY 1987 (February 1985), pp. 52. 53, 58, 59, 6 8 . ~
15. Teresa Hayter and Catharine Watson. AID: Rhetoric and Reality (London:
Pluto Press, 1985), p. 2.
- 19-
16. Herald (Harare), 25 June 1985.
17. Herald (Harare), 13. June 1985.
»
18. Reginald Green. "IMF Raging Controversy and Criticism,” Third World 
Book Review 1, no. 2 (198*0, p. 66
"  A
19. Simla. Makoni, Executive Secretary, SADCC. Press Conference, Harare
(15 August 1985). '
20. SADCC. "An Illustrative Assessment of the Cost of Destabilisation on the 
Member States of SADCC," paper presented to the OAU, Addis Ababa (18-19 July 
1985), p. 1.
i
21. People’s Republic of Mozambique. Economic Report(Maputo. January 1984),
p. 4l. .
22. Africa Economic Digest (21 December 1984).
23. SADCC. "SADCC in the Context of the Lagos Plan of Action," paper 
presented to the OAU, Addis.Ababa (18-19 July 1985)* p. 5*
24. Joseph Hanlon. SADCC: Progress. Projects and Prospects (London: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1984), p. 12.
25. ibid., p. 13.
26. ibid., p. 86.
27. FAO. SADCC Agriculture Toward 2000 (Rome: FAO, 1984), p. 6.3
28. Interviews of officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone, Botswana 
(July 1985).
29. FAO. SADCC. op. cit., p. 6.4 .
30. ibid., p. 6.3.
31. Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher. The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 
(Washington, D\ C .: The Brookings Institution, 1973)* PP*-713-14* quoted in 
Teresa Hay ter and Catharine Watson, op. cit., p. 156.
32. SADCC* Food and Agriculture (Mbabane: 31 January-1 February 1985), p. 2.
33. FAO. SADCC. op. cit., p. 6.5.
34. SADCC. A Regional Resources Information System, Vol.2, Country Reports 
(November 1982), pp. 2-5 of each country report.
35. SADCC. Annual Progress Report (July 1984 - July 1985). p. 5*
36. ibid.
37. SADCC. "Program of Work and Budget 1985-86: Southern African Centre 
for Cooperation in Agricultural Research" (9 April 1985).
38. Interview of Louis Kazhani, Plant Breeder, Government of Botswana,
(12 June 1985).
39. SADCC. SADCC Industrial Projects Workshop (Harare, 10-11 January 1984), 
pp. xiv.
- 20-
40. SADCC. Annual Progress Report, op. cit. pp. 42-48.
41. Barbara.Dinham and Colin Hines. Agribusiness in Africa (London: Earth 
Resources, Ltd., 1983), p. 43.
42. Interviews with U.S.A.I.O. officials, May 1985. See also paper by a 
prominent AID consultant: Carl Eicher. "Agricultural Research for African 
Development," World Bank Conference on Research, Bellagio (25 Feb-1 March 1985)
43. Interview with Louis Mashani, op. cit.
44. Sunday Mail (Harare), 4 April 1985; Herald (Harare), 26 June 1985.
45. Simba Makoni, op. cit.
46. Sunday Mail (Harare), 31 March 1985; Herald (Harare) 4 March and 8 August 
1985.
47. Working Group Regarding Extended Economic Cooperation between the Nordic
Countries and a Group of Less-Developed Countries. "Report to Government 
Officials on Assistance'* (Helsinki: 22 October 1984).
48. Gosta Edgren. "Statement on Behalf of the Nordic Countries," SADCC 
Conference (Mbabane: 31 January-1 February 1985).
49. ibid.
50. SADCC* Agricultural Research Conference Report (Gaborone: 21-23 February 
1984), p. 138.
51. SADCC. Annual Progress Report. op. cit. pp. 27» 30.
ft
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
Institute o f 
Development Studies
